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Abstract
The concept of free energy has its origins in 19th century thermodynamics, but has recently found its way into the behav-
ioral andneural sciences, where it has been promoted for itswide applicability and has even been suggested as a fundamental
principle of understanding intelligent behavior and brain function. We argue that there are essentially two different notions
of free energy in current models of intelligent agency, that can both be considered as applications of Bayesian inference to
the problem of action selection: one that appears when trading off accuracy and uncertainty based on a general maxi-
mum entropy principle, and one that formulates action selection in terms of minimizing an error measure that quantifies
deviations of beliefs and policies from given reference models. The first approach provides a normative rule for action
selection in the face of model uncertainty or when information processing capabilities are limited. The second approach
directly aims to formulate the action selection problem as an inference problem in the context of Bayesian brain theories,
also known as Active Inference in the literature. We elucidate the main ideas and discuss critical technical and conceptual
issues revolving around these two notions of free energy that both claim to apply at all levels of decision-making, from the
high-level deliberation of reasoning down to the low-level information processing of perception.
Keywords: free energy, intelligent agency, bayesian inference, maximum entropy, utility theory, active inference
1. Introduction
There is a surprising line of thought connecting some of the
greatest scientists of the last centuries, including ImmanuelKant,
Hermann von Helmholtz, Ludwig E. Boltzmann, and Claude E.
Shannon, whereby model-based processes of action, perception,
and communication are explainedwith concepts borrowed from
statistical physics. Inspired by Kant’s Copernican revolution and
motivated from his own studies of the physiology of the sen-
sory system, Helmholtz was one of the first proponents of the
analysis-by-synthesis approach to perception (Yuille and Kersten,
2006), whereby a perceiver is not simply conceptualized as some
kind of tabula rasa recording raw external stimuli, but rather
relies on internal models of the world to match and anticipate
sensory inputs. The internal model paradigm is now ubiquitous
in the cognitive and neural sciences and has even led some re-
searchers to propose a Bayesian brain hypothesis, whereby the
brain would essentially be a prediction and inference engine
based on internal models (Kawato, 1999; Flanagan et al., 2003;
Doya, 2007). Coincidentally, Helmholtz also invented the no-
tion of the Helmholtz free energy that plays an important role in
thermodynamics and statisticalmechanics, even thoughhe never
made a connection between the two concepts in his lifetime.
This connection was first made by Dayan, Hinton, Neal, and
Zemel in their computational model of perceptual processing
as a statistical inference engine known as the Helmholtz machine
(Dayan et al., 1995). In this neural network architecture, there
are feed-forward and feedback pathways, where the bottom-up
pathway translates inputs from the bottom layer into hidden
causes at the upper layer (the recognition model), and top-down
activation translates simulated hidden causes into simulated in-
puts (the generative model). When considering log-likelihood in
this setup as energy in analogy to statistical mechanics, learning
becomes a relaxation process that can be described by the min-
imization of variational free energy. While it should be empha-
sized that variational free energy is not the same as Helmholtz
free energy, the two free energy concepts can be formally related.
Importantly, variational free energy minimization is not only a
hallmark of theHelmholtzmachine, but of amore general family
of inference algorithms, such as the popular EM algorithm (Neal
and Hinton, 1998; Beal, 2003). In fact, over the last two decades,
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2 The Two Kinds of Free Energy and the Bayesian Revolution
variational Bayesian methods have become one of the foremost
approximation schemes for tractable inference in the machine
learning literature. Moreover, a plethora ofmachine learning ap-
proaches use loss functions that have the shape of a free energy
when optimizing performance under entropy regularization in
order to boost generalization of learning models (Williams and
Peng, 1991; Mnih et al., 2016).
In the meanwhile, free energy concepts have also made their
way into the behavioral sciences. In the economic literature,
for example, trade-offs between utility and entropic uncertainty
measures that take the form of free energies have been proposed
to describe decision-makers with stochastic choice behavior due
to limited resources (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Sims, 2003;
Mattsson and Weibull, 2002; McFadden, 2005; Wolpert, 2006)
or robust decision-makers with limited precision in their mod-
els (Maccheroni et al., 2006; Hansen and Sargent, 2008). The
free energy trade-off between entropy and reward can also be
found in information-theoretic models of biological perception-
action systems (Still, 2009; Tishby and Polani, 2011; Ortega and
Braun, 2013), some of which have been subjected to experimen-
tal testing (Ortega and Stocker, 2016; Sims, 2016; Schach et al.,
2018; Lindig-León et al., 2019; Bhui and Gershman, 2018; Ho
et al., 2020). Finally, in the neuroscience literature the notion of
free energy has risen to recent fame as the central puzzle piece
in the Free Energy Principle (Friston, 2010) that has been used
to explain a cornucopia of experimental findings including neu-
ral prediction error signals (Sales et al., 2019), synaptic plastic-
ity rules(Bogacz, 2017), neural effects of biased competition and
attention (Friston et al., 2012; Parr and Friston, 2017), visual ex-
ploration in humans (Mirza et al., 2018), and more—see the ref-
erences in (Parr and Friston, 2019). Over time, the Free En-
ergy Principle has grown out of an application of the free en-
ergy concept used in the Helmholtz machine, to interpret corti-
cal responses in the context of predictive coding (Friston, 2005),
and has gradually developed into a general principle for intelli-
gent agency, also known as Active Inference (Friston et al., 2013,
2015; Parr and Friston, 2019). Consequences and implications
of the Free Energy Principle are discussed in neighbouring fields
like psychiatry (Schwartenbeck and Friston, 2016; Linson et al.,
2020) and the philosophy of mind (Clark, 2013; Colombo and
Wright, 2018).
Given that the notion of free energy has become such a per-
vasive concept that cuts through multiple disciplines, the main
rationale for this discussion paper is to trace back and to clar-
ify different notions of free energy, to see how they are related
and what role they play in explaining behavior and neural activ-
ity. As the notion of free energy mainly appears in the context
of statistical models of cognition, the language of probabilistic
models constitutes a common framework in the following dis-
cussion. Section 2 therefore starts with preliminary remarks on
probabilisticmodelling. Section 3 introduces two notions of free
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Figure 1. Graphical representation of an exemplary probabilistic model.
The arrows (edges) indicate causal relationships between the random vari-
ables (nodes). The full joint distribution p0 over all random variables is
sometimes also referred to as a generative model, because it contains the
complete knowledge about the random variables and their dependencies
and therefore allows to generate simulated data. Such a model could for
example be used by a farmer to infer the soil quality S based on the crop
yields X through Bayesian inference, which allows to determine a priori
unknown distributions such as p(S|X) from the generative model p0 via
marginalization and conditionalization.
energy that are subsequently expounded in Section 4 and Sec-
tion 5, where they are applied to models of intelligent agency.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Probabilistic models and perception-action systems
Systems that show stochastic behavior, for example due to
randomly behaving components or because the observer ignores
certain degrees of freedom, are modelled using probability dis-
tributions. This way, any behavioral, environmental, and hidden
variables can be related by their statistics, and dynamical changes
can be modelled by changes in their distributions.
Consider, for example, the simple probabilistic model illus-
trated in Fig 1, consisting of the (for simplicity, discrete) variables
past and future soil quality S := (S, S′), past and future crop yields
X := (X,X ′), and fertilization A. The graphical model shown
in the figure corresponds to the joint probability p0(X,S, A)
given by the factorization
p0(X ′|S′) p0(X|S) p0(S′|S,A) p0(S) p0(A) , (1)
where p0(S) is the base probability of the past soil quality S,
p0(X|S) is the probability of crop yields X depending on the
past soil quality S, and so forth. Given the joint distribution we
can now ask questions about each of the variables. For example,
we could ask about the probability distribution p(S|X= x) of
soil quality S if we are told that the crop yieldsX are equal to a
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value x. We can obtain the answer from the probabilistic model
p0 by doing Bayesian inference, yielding the Bayes’ posterior
p(S|X) = p(S,X)∑
s p(s,X)
= p0(X|S)p0(S)∑
s p0(X|s)p0(s)
, (2)
where the dependencies onX ′,S′, andA have been summed out
to calculate themarginal p(S,X). In general, Bayesian inference
in a probabilistic model means to determine the probability of
some queried unobserved variables given the knowledge of some
observed variables. This can be viewed as transforming the prior
probabilistic model p0 to a posterior model p, under which the
observed values have probability one and unobserved variables
have probabilities given by the corresponding Bayes’ posteriors.
In principle, Bayesian inference requires only two different
kinds of operations, namely marginalization, i.e. summing out
unobserved variables that have not been queried, such asX ′, S′
and A above, and conditionalization, i.e. renormalizing the joint
distribution over observed and queried variables—thatmay itself
be the result from a previous marginalization such as p(S,X)
above—to obtain the required conditional distribution over the
queried variables. In practice, however, inference is a hard com-
putational problem and many more efficient inference methods
are available thatmay provide approximate solutions to the exact
Bayes’ posteriors, including belief propagation (Pearl, 1988), ex-
pectation propagation (Minka, 2001), variational Bayesian infer-
ence (Hinton and van Camp, 1993), andMonte Carlo algorithms
(MacKay, 2002). Also note that inference is trivial if the sought-
after conditional distribution of the queried variable is already
given by one of the conditional distributions that jointly specify
the probabilistic model, e.g. p(X|S) = p0(X|S).
Probabilistic models can not only be used as external (observer)
models, but also as internal models that are employed by the agent
itself, or by a designer of the agent, in order to determine a de-
sired course of action. In this latter case, actions could either be
thought of as deterministic parameters of the probabilisticmodel
that influence the future (influence diagrams) or as random vari-
ables that are part of the probabilistic model themselves (prior
models) (Boutilier et al., 1999). Either way, internal models al-
low making predictions over future consequences in order to
find actions or distributions over actions that lead to desirable
outcomes, for example actions that produce high rewards in the
future. In mechanistic or process model interpretations, some of
the specification procedures to find such actions are themselves
meant to represent what the agent is actually doing while rea-
soning, whereas as if interpretations simply use these methods
as tools to arrive at distributions that describe the agent’s behav-
ior. Free energy is one of the concepts that appears in both types
of methods.
3. The two notions of free energy
Vaguely speaking, free energy can refer to any quantity that is
of the form
free energy = energy ± const.× entropy, (3)
where energy is an expected value of some quantitity of inter-
est, entropy refers to a quantity measuring disorder, uncertainty,
or complexity, that must be specified in the given context, and
const. is a constant term that translates between units of entropy
and energy, and is related to the temperature in physically moti-
vated free energy expressions. From relation (3), it is not surpris-
ing that free energy sometimes appears enshrouded by mystery,
as it relies on an understanding of entropy, and “nobody really
knowswhat entropy is anyway”, as John VonNeumann famously
quipped (Feynman et al., 1996).
Historically, the concept of free energy goes back to the roots
of thermodynamics, where it was introduced to measure the
maximum amount of work that can be extracted from a thermo-
dynamic system at a constant temperature and volume. If, for ex-
ample, all the molecules in a box move to the left, we can use this
kinetic energy to drive a turbine. If, however, the same kinetic
energy is distributed as random molecular motion, it cannot be
fully transformed intowork. Therefore, only part of the total en-
ergyE is usable, because the exact positions andmomenta of the
molecules, the so-called microstates, are unknown. In this case,
the maximum usable part of the energy E is the Helmholtz free
energy, defined as
F = E − TS , (4)
where S is the thermodynamic entropy. In general, the transfor-
mation between two macrostates with free energies F1 and F2
allows the extraction of workW ≤ F2 − F1.
While the two notions of free energy thatwe discuss in the fol-
lowing are vaguely inspired by the physical original, their moti-
vations are rather distinct and the main reason they share the
nomenclature is due to their general form (3) resembling the
Helmholtz free energy (4).
3.1. Free energy from constraints
The first notion of free energy is closely tied to the princi-
ple of maximum entropy (Jaynes, 1957), which virtually appears
in all branches of science. From this vantage point, the phys-
ical free energy is merely a special instance of a more general
inference problemwhere we hold probabilistic beliefs about un-
known quantities (e.g. the exact energy values of the molecules
in a gas) and we can onlymake coarse measurements or observa-
tions (e.g. the temperature of the gas) that we can use to update
our beliefs about these hidden variables. The principle of maxi-
mum entropy suggests that, among the beliefs that are compati-
ble with the observation, we should choose the most “unbiased”
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belief, in the sense that it corresponds to a maximum number of
possible assignments of the hidden variables.
3.1.1. Wallis’ motivation of the maximum entropy principle
Consider the random experiment of distributingN elements
randomly in n equally probable buckets with N  n, where
the resulting number of elementsNi in bucket i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
determines the probability p(zi) := NiN . In principle, this way
we could generate any distribution p over a finite set Ω =
{z1, . . . , zn} that we like, however, a uniform distribution that
reflects the equiprobable assignment clearly is much more likely
than a Dirac distribution where all the probability mass is con-
centrated in one bucket. Here, the reason is that there are many
possible assignments of elements among the buckets that gen-
erate the uniform distribution, whereas there is only one for a
Dirac distribution. In fact, the number of possibilities of how to
distributeN elements among n buckets withNi elements in the
ith bucket is
ω := N !
N1! · · ·Nn! , (5)
because N ! is the number of possible permutations of all N el-
ements, which overcounts by the number of permutations of el-
ements inside the same bucket and thus has to be divided by the
number of permutationsNi! for all i = 1, . . . , n. In the absence
of any further measurement constraints, the number of possibil-
ities (5) is maximized byNi = N/n for all i, and thus the typical
distribution p∗ overΩ in this case is the uniform distribution, i.e.
p∗(zi) = 1n for all i.
Consider now the problem of having to determine a typical
distribution p∗ over Ω such that the expected value Ep∗ [E ] =:
〈E〉p∗ of some quantity E equals a measured value ε. A simple
example would be the experiment of throwing N dice and tak-
ing E to be the number of dots, i.e. E(z1) = 1, . . . , E(z6) =
6, and trying to find the typical distribution p∗ over outcomes
z1, . . . , z6 under the constraint that the average number of dots
is, say ε = 2. The solution to this problem is analogous to the
case of no constraints, but this time we only consider realiza-
tions that are compatible with the measurement constraint, that
is we let (N1, . . . , Nn) belong to the set of permissible occupa-
tion vectors
Γε :=
{
(N1, . . . , Nn)
∣∣ 〈E〉p = ε, p(zi) = NiN ∀i}.
A typical distribution p∗ for a constraint ε can then be deter-
mined by a candidate inΓε with themaximumnumberω of pos-
sibilities (5). By assumption,N is much larger than n, so that we
can get rid of the faculties by making use of Stirling’s approxi-
mation lnN ! = N lnN − N + O(lnN). In particular, when
letting N,Ni → ∞ such that p(zi) = NiN remains finite, we
obtain
1
N
logω = −
n∑
i=1
Ni
N
log Ni
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H(p)
+O
(
logN
N
)
N→∞−→ H(p) .
where H(p) := −∑z∈Ω p(z) log p(z) denotes the (Gibbs or
Shannon) entropy of p. Thus, instead of assessing typicality by
maximizing (5) in Γε for large but fixedN , we can get rid of the
N-dependency by simply maximizingH ,
p∗ = argmax
p,〈E〉p=ε
H(p) . (6)
This constrained optimization problem is knownas the principle
of maximum entropy. The motivation given here is essentially
the Wallis derivation presented by Jaynes (Jaynes, 2003).
3.1.2. Free energy from constraints and the Boltzmann distribution
The constrained optimization problem (6) can be translated
into an unconstrained problem by introducing a Lagrange mul-
tiplier β, known as the inverse temperature due to the analogy to
thermodynamics and the Helmholtz Free Energy (4), which has
to be chosen post hoc such that the constraint is satisfied. This
results in the minimization of the Lagrangian
F (p) := 〈E〉p− 1βH(p), (7)
which takes the form of a free energy (3). As we shall see later,
F takes its minimum at the Boltzmann distribution known from
statistical mechanics, given by
p∗(z) := 1Z e
−βE(z), (8)
whereZ = ∑z∈Ω e−βE(z) denotes the normalization constant.
Note that, the argument in the previous section implicitly as-
sumes a uniform reference distribution, because the buckets are
assumed to be equiprobable. When replacing this assumption by
a general distribution p0 over Ω, we obtain the principle of min-
imum relative entropy (Rosenkrantz, 1983), where the so-called
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence DKL(p‖p0) = 〈log(p/p0)〉p is
minimized with respect to p subject to a constraint 〈E〉p = ε.
Analogous to the maximum entropy principle, this translates to
the unconstrained minimization of the Lagrangian
F (p, p0) := 〈E〉p + 1βDKL(p‖p0), (9)
with solution given by p∗(z) = 1Z p0(z) e−βE(z).
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Figure 2. Minimizing the free energy from constraints (7) requires to trade
o the competing terms of energy 〈E〉p and entropyH(p), here shown ex-
emplarily for the case of three elements. Assuming there exists a unique
minimal element z∗ = argminz E(z), then minimizing only 〈E〉p over all
probability distributions p results in the (Dirac delta) distribution δz∗ that
assigns zero probability to all zi 6= z∗ and probability one to zi = z∗, and
therefore has zero entropy. In contrast,minimizing only the term−H(p)/β
is equivalent tomaximizingH(p) and thereforewould result in the uniform
distribution that gives equal probability toall elements. The resultingBoltz-
mann distribution p∗ interpolates between these two extreme solutions of
minimal energy (β →∞) andmaximum entropy (β → 0).
3.1.3. The trade-o between energy and uncertainty
An important feature of the minimization of the free energies
(7) and (9) consists in the balancing of the two competing terms
of energy and entropy (cf. Fig 2). This trade-off between max-
imal uncertainty (uniform distribution, or p0) on the one hand
and minimal energy (e.g. a delta distribution) on the other hand
is the core of the maximum entropy principle. The inverse tem-
perature β plays the role of a trade-off parameter that controls
how these two counteracting forces are weighted.
The maximum entropy principle goes back to the principle of
insufficient reason (Bernoulli, 1713; de Laplace, 1812; Poincaré,
1912), which states that two events should be assigned the same
probability if there is no reason to think otherwise. It has been
hailed as a principled method to determine prior distributions
and to incorporate novel information into existing probabilis-
tic knowledge. In fact, Bayesian inference can be cast in terms
of relative entropy minimization with constraints given by the
available information (Williams, 1980). Applications of this idea
can also be found in the machine learning literature, where sub-
tracting (or adding) an entropy term from an expected value of a
function that must be optimized is known as entropy regulariza-
tion and plays an important role in modern reinforcement learn-
ing algorithms (Williams and Peng, 1991; Mnih et al., 2016) to
encourage exploration (Haarnoja et al., 2017) as well as to penal-
ize overly deterministic policies resulting in biased reward esti-
mates (Fox et al., 2016).
From now on, we refer to a free energy expression that is mo-
tivated from a trade-off between an energy and an entropy term,
such as (7) and (9), as free energy from constraints, in order to dis-
criminate it from the notion of free energy introduced in the fol-
lowing section, which—despite of its resemblance—has a differ-
ent motivation.
3.2. Variational free energy
There is another, distinct appeara ce of the term “free energy”
outside of phys cs, which is a priori notmotivated from a trade-
off between an energy and entropy term, but from possible ef-
ficiency gains when representing Bayes’ rule in terms of an op-
timization problem. This technique is mainly used in variational
Bayesian inference (Koller, 2009, Ch. 11), originally introduced by
Hinton and van Camp (Hinton and van Camp, 1993). As before,
for simplicity all random variables are discrete, but most expres-
sions can directly be translated to the continuous case by replac-
ing probability distributions by probability densities and sums
by the corresponding integrals.
3.2.1. Variational Bayesian inference
As we have seen in Section 2, Bayesian inference consists in
the calculation of a conditional probability distribution over un-
knownvariables given the values of knownvariables. In themost
simple case of two variables, say X and Z , and a probabilistic
model of the form p0(X,Z) = p0(X|Z)p0(Z), Bayesian infer-
ence applies ifX is observed and Z is queried. Analogous to (2),
the exact Bayes’ posterior p(Z|X= x) is defined by the renor-
malization of p0(x, Z) in order to obtain a distribution over Z
that respects the new informationX= x,
p(Z|X= x) = p0(x, Z)Z(x) =
p0(x|Z) p0(Z)
Z(x) , (10)
with the normalization constantZ(x) = ∑z p0(x, z).
In variational Bayesian inference, however, this Bayes’ poste-
rior is not calculated directly by renormalizing p0(x, Z)with re-
spect to Z , but indirectly by approximating it by a distribution
q(Z) that is adjusted through the minimization of an error mea-
sure that quantifies the deviation from the exact Bayes’ posterior.
Importantly, the value of this error measure can be determined
without having to know the exact Bayes’ posterior. To see this,
note that the KL divergence between q(Z) and p(Z|X= x) can
be written as〈
log q(Z)
p(Z|X= x)
〉
q(Z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=DKL(q(Z)‖p(Z|X= x))
= logZ(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
indep. of q
+
〈
log q(Z)
p0(x, Z)
〉
q(Z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:F (q(Z)‖p0(x,Z))
,
(11)
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Figure 3. The normalization of a functonφ to obtain a probability distribution pφ is equivalent to fitting trial distributions q to the shape ofφ byminimizing
free energy. In two dimensions, the normalization of a point φ = (φ1, φ2) corresponds to a (non-orthogonal) projection onto the plane of probability
vectors (A). For continuous domains, where probability distributions are represented by densities, normalization corresponds to a rescaling of φ such that
the area below the graph equals 1 (B). Instead, when minimizing variational free energy (red colour), the trial distributions q are varied until they fit to the
shape of the unnormalized function φ (perfectly at q = pφ).
i.e. it can be decomposed into the sum of a constant term and a
term that does not depend on the normalization Z(x). In par-
ticular, a good approximation q(Z) of the exact Bayes’ posterior
(10) will effectively minimize this KL divergence, which—due to
(11)—can be done by minimizing F (q(Z)‖p0(x, Z)). In partic-
ular, the optimiumof thisminimization is exactly achieved at the
Bayes’ posterior (10),
argmin
q(Z)
〈
log q(Z)
p0(x, Z)
〉
q(Z)
= p(Z|X= x) , (12)
which is known as the variational characterization of Bayes’ rule.
This result is a special case of (14) in the following section.
3.2.2. Variational free energy, an extension of relative entropy
Any non-negative function φ on a finite space Ω, can be nor-
malized to obtain a probability distribution pφ = φ/
∑
z φ(z)
onΩ that differs fromφ only by a scaling constant. In caseswhen
it is not beneficial to carry out the sum
∑
z φ(z) explicitly, such
a normalization might be replaced by the minimization of the
variational free energy
F (q‖φ) :=
〈
log q(Z)
φ(Z)
〉
q(Z)
, (13)
with respect to the so-called trial distributions q, because we have
argmin
q
F (q‖φ) = φ(Z)∑
z φ(z)
= pφ(Z) . (14)
Thus, instead of normalizing φ directly, one fits auxiliary distri-
butions q to approximate the shape of φ in the space of proba-
bility distributions (cf. Fig 3). If this optimization process has no
constraints, then the trial distributions are adjusted until pφ is
achieved. In the case of constraints, for instance if the trial distri-
butions are parametrized by a non-exhaustive parametrization
(e.g. Gaussians), then the optimized trial distributions approx-
imate pφ as close as possible within this parametrization. The
minimal value of F (q‖φ) is
F (pφ‖φ) = min
q
F (q‖φ) = − log
∑
z
φ(z) . (15)
In particular, this implies that−F (q‖φ) ≤ log∑z φ(z) for all
q, so that varying −F (q‖φ) with arbitrary trial distributions q
always provides a lower bound to the unknown normalization
constant
∑
z φ(z). In Bayesian inference this is the normaliza-
tion constant in Bayes’ rule and called the model evidence, which
is why the negative variational free energy is also called evidence
lower bound (ELBO).
The proof of (14) and (15) directly follows from Jensen’s in-
equality and only relies on the concavity of the logarithm. As we
have seen in the previous section, in variational Bayesian infer-
ence, the reference φ usually takes the form of a joint distribution
evaluated at the observed variables, e.g. φ(Z) = p0(x, Z) in
which case (14) recovers (12). The variational free energy (13)
is a free energy in the sense of (3) since by the additivity of the
logarithm under multiplication (log ab = log a+ log b),
F (q‖φ) = 〈− log φ〉q −H(q) (16)
with energy term 〈− log φ〉q and entropy termH(q). Note that,
for the choice φ = e−βE , Equation (14) becomes the Boltzmann
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Figure 4. In variational Bayesian inference, the operation of renormalizing the probabilistic model p0 evaluated at an observationX= x (Bayes’ rule), is
replaced by an optimization problem. In practice, this variational representation is oen exploited to simplify a given inference problem, either by reducing
the seach space of distributions, for example through a restrictive parametrization resulting in approximate inference, or by splitting up the optimization
into multiple partial optimization steps that are potentially easier to solve than the original problem but might still converge to the exact solution. These
two simplifications can also be combined, for example in the case of mean-field assumptions where the space of distributions is reduced and an eicient
iterative inference algorithm is obtained at the same time.
distribution (8) and the variational free energy (16) formally cor-
responds to the free energy from constraints (7).
Variational free energy can be regarded as an extension of rel-
ative entropy with the reference distribution being replaced by
a non-normalized reference function, since in the case when φ
is already normalized, that is if
∑
z φ(z) = 1, then the free en-
ergy (13) coincides with the KL divergence DKL(q‖φ). In par-
ticular, while relative entropy is a measure for the dissimilarity
of two probability distributions, where theminimum is achieved
if both distributions are equal, variational free energy is a mea-
sure for the dissimilarity between a probability distribution q
and a (generally non-normalized) function φ, where the mini-
mum with respect to q is achieved at pφ. Accordingly, we can
think of the variational free energy as a specific error measure
between probability distributions and reference functions. In
principle, one could designmany other error measures that have
the sameminimum. Thismeans that, a statement in a probabilis-
tic setting that a distribution q∗ minimizes a variational free en-
ergy F (q‖φ) with respect to a given reference φ, is analogous to
a statement in a non-probabilistic setting that some number x∗
minimizes the value of an errormeasure (x, y) (e.g. the squared
error (x, y) = (x−y)2) with respect to a given reference value
y.
3.2.3. Approximate and iterative inference
Representing Bayes’ rule as an optimization problem over
auxiliary distributions q has two main applications that both
can simplify the inference process (cf. Fig 4). First, it allows to
approximate exact Bayes’ posteriors by restricting the optimiza-
tion space, for example using a non-exhaustive parametrization,
e.g. an exponential family. Second, it enables iterative inference
algorithms consisting of multiple simpler optimization steps, for
example by optimizing with respect to each term in a factorized
representation of q separately. A popular choice is themean-field
approximation, which combines both of these simplifications, as
it assumes independence between hidden states, effectively re-
ducing the search space from joint distributions to factorized
ones, and moreover it allows to optimize with respect to each
factor alternatingly. Note, however, that mean-field approxi-
mations have limited use in sequential environments, where in-
dependence of subsequent states cannot be assumed and there-
fore less restrictive assumptionsmust be used instead (Opper and
Saad, 2001).
Many efficient iterative algorithms for exact and approximate
inference can be viewed as examples of variational free energy
minimization, for example the Expectation-Maximization (EM)
algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977; Neal and Hinton, 1998), belief
propagation (Pearl, 1988; Yedidia et al., 2001), and othermessage
passing algorithms(Minka, 2001; Wainwright et al., 2005; Winn
and Bishop, 2005; Minka, 2005; Yedidia et al., 2005). While the
(Bayesian) EM algorithm (Beal, 2003) and Pearl’s belief propaga-
tion (Yedidia et al., 2001) both canbe seen asminimizing the same
variational free energy, just with different assumptions on the
approximate posteriors, in (Minka, 2005), it is shown that also
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many other message passing algorithms such as (Minka, 2001;
Wainwright et al., 2005; Winn and Bishop, 2005) can be cast as
minimizing some type of free energy, the only difference being
the choice of the divergencemeasure as the entropy term. Simple
versions of these algorithms have often existed before their free
energy formulations were available, but the variational repre-
sentations usually allowed for extensions and refinements—see
(Csiszár and Tusnády, 1984; Hathaway, 1986; Neal and Hinton,
1998; Beal, 2003) in case of EM and (Yedidia et al., 2001; Heskes,
2003; Yuille, 2002; Yedidia et al., 2005) in case ofmessage passing.
We are now turning to the question of how the two notions of
free energy introduced in this section are related to recent theo-
ries of intelligent agency.
4. Free energy from constraints in information process-
ing
4.1. The basic idea
The concept of free energy from constraints as a trade-
off between energy and uncertainty can be used in models of
perception-action systems, where entropy quantifies informa-
tion processing complexity required for decision-making (e.g.
planning a path for fleeing a predator) and energy corresponds
to performance (e.g. distinguishing better andworse flight direc-
tions). The notion of decision in this context is very broad and
can be applied to any internal variable in the perception-action
pipeline (Kahneman, 2002), that is not given directly by the envi-
ronment. In particular, it also subsumes perception itself, where
the decision variables are given by the hidden causes that are be-
ing inferred from observations.
In rational choice theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944), a decision-maker selects decisionsx∗ froma set of options
Ω such that a utility function U defined on Ω is maximized,
x∗ = argmax
x∈Ω
U(x) . (17)
The utility values U(x) could either be objective, for example
a monetary gain, or subjective in which case they represent the
decision-maker’s preferences. In general, the utility does not
have to be defined directly onΩ, but could be derived fromutility
values that are attached to certain states, for example to the con-
figurations of the playboard in a board game. In the case of per-
ception, utility values are usually given by (log-)likelihood func-
tions, in which case utility maximization without constraints
corresponds to greedy inference such asmaximum likelihood es-
timation. Note that, for simplicity, in this section we consider
one-step decision problems. Sequential tasks can either be seen
as multiple one-step problems where the utility of a given step
might depend on the policy over future steps, or as path planning
problems where an action represents a full action path or policy
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Figure 5. A: Decision-making can be considered as a search process in the
space of options Ω, where options are progressively ruled out. Delibera-
tion costs are defined to bemonotone functions under such uncertainty re-
duction. B: Exemplary eiciency curve resulting from the trade-obetween
utility andcosts, that separatesnon-optimal fromnon-admissiblebehavior.
The points on the curve correspond to bounded-optimal agents that opti-
mally trade o utility against uncertainty, analogous to the rate-distortion
curve in information theory.
(Whittle, 1990; Tishby and Polani, 2011; Grau-Moya et al., 2016;
Gottwald and Braun, 2019b).
While ideal rational decision-makers are assumed to per-
fectly optimize a given utility function U , real behavior is often
stochastic, meaning that multiple exposures to the same prob-
lem lead to different decisions. Such non-deterministic behav-
ior could be a consequence of model uncertainty, as in Bayesian
inference or various stochastic gambling schemes, or a conse-
quence of satisficing (Simon, 1955), where decision-makers do
not choose the single best option, but simply one option that
is good enough. Abstractly, this means that, the choice of a
single decision is replaced by the choice of a distribution over
decisions. More generally, also considering prior information
that the decision-maker might have from previous experience,
the process of deliberation during decision-makingmight be ex-
pressed as the transformation of a prior p0 to a posterior distri-
bution p.
When assuming that deliberation has a cost C(p, p0), then
arriving at narrow posterior distributions should intuitively be
more costly than choosing distributions that contain more un-
certainty (cf. Fig 5A). In other words, deliberation costs must be
increasing with the amount of uncertainty that is reduced by the
transformation from p0 to p. Uncertainty reduction can be un-
derstood asmaking the probabilities of options less equal to each
other, rigorously expressed by the mathematical concept of ma-
jorization (Marshall et al., 2011). This notion of uncertainty can
also be generalized to include prior information, so that the de-
gree of uncertainty reduction corresponds to more or less devi-
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ations from the prior (Gottwald and Braun, 2019a).
Maximizing expected utility 〈U〉p with respect to p under re-
strictions on processing costs C(p, p0) is a constrained opti-
mization problem that can be interpreted as a particular model
of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955), explaining non-rational be-
havior of decision-makers that may be unable to select the single
best option by their limited information processing capability.
Similarly to the free energy trade-off between energy and en-
tropy (cf. Fig 2), this results in a trade-off between utility 〈U〉p
and processing costsC(p, p0),
Fβ(p) := 〈U〉p − 1βC(p, p0). (18)
Here, the trade-off parameter β is analogous to the in-
verse temperature in statistical mechanics (cf. Equation (7)) and
parametrizes the optimal trade-offs p∗β = argmaxp Fβ(p) be-
tween utility and cost, that define an efficiency frontier sep-
arating the space of perception-action systems into bounded-
optimal, non-optimal, and non-admissible systems (cf. Fig 5).
When assuming that the total transformation cost is the same
independent of whether a decision problem is solved in one step
or multiple sub-steps (additivity under coarse-graining) the trade-
off in (18) takes the general form (3) of a free energy in the sense
of energy (utility) minus entropy (cost), because then the cost
function is uniquely given by the relative entropy
C(p, p0) = DKL(p‖p0). (19)
Note that the additivity of (19) also implies a coarse-graining
property of the free energy (18) in the case when the decision
is split into multiple steps, such that the utility of preceding de-
cisions is effectively given by the free energy of following de-
cisions. Therefore, in this case, free energy can be seen as a
certainty-equivalent value of the subordinate decision problems,
i.e. the amount of utility the agent would have to receive to be
indifferent between this guaranteed utility and the potential ex-
pected utility of the subsequent decision steps taking account
the associated information processing costs. The special case
(19) has been studied extensively in multiple contexts, includ-
ing quantal response equilibria in the game-theoretic literature
(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Wolpert, 2006), rational inatten-
tion and costly contemplation (Sims, 2003; Ergin and Sarver,
2010), bounded rationality with KL costs (Mattsson andWeibull,
2002; Ortega and Braun, 2013), KL control (Todorov, 2009; Kap-
pen et al., 2012), entropy regularization (Williams and Peng,
1991; Mnih et al., 2016), robustness (Maccheroni et al., 2006;
Hansen and Sargent, 2008), the emergence of heuristics (Binz
et al., 2020), thermodynamic models of computation (Wolpert,
2019), and the analysis of information flow in perception-action
systems (Tishby and Polani, 2011; Still, 2009). While (19) is of-
ten regarded as an abstract measure of uncertainty reduction or
a generic proxy for information processing costs, it can also be
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viewed as a physical capacity constraint, where the information
that is required to achieve a certain expected utility is considered
to be sent over a channel to the actuator (Miller, 1956; Garner,
1962;MacRae, 1970; Tatikonda andMitter, 2004; Bhui and Ger-
shman, 2018). This view is also consistent with the maximum
entropy principle, as (18) and (19) favor distributions p that can
be generated from p0 most easily in terms of statistics, and there-
fore with minimum communication complexity between p0 and
p (Harsha et al., 2010).
4.2. A Simple Example
Ingredients. Consider the probabilistic model shown in Fig 1
with the joint distribution p0(X,S, A) that is specified by the
factors in the decomposition (1). Here, S and X denote the
current environmental state and the corresponding observation,
and A denotes the action that must be determined in order to
drive the system into a new state S′ with observation X ′. The
decision-making problem is specified by assuming that we have
given a utility function U over future observations X ′ which
the decision-maker seeks to maximize by selecting an action A,
while only having access to the current observation X . This
means that the decision-maker has control over the distribution
p(A|X), which replaces the prior p0(A) in the factorization (1)
of the prior model p0(X,S, A) to determine the factorization
of the posterior model p(X,S, A) in terms of the fixed compo-
nents in p0 (cf. Fig 6) as
p(X,S, A) = p0(X ′|S′) p0(X|S) p0(S′|S,A) p0(S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
p0(X,S|A)
p(A|X) .
(20)
Free energy from constraints. Further assuming that the decision-
maker is subject to an information processing constraint
DKL(p‖p0)≤C0, for some non-negative bound C0, results in
the unconstrained optimization problem maxp F (p) with free
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energy given by (18), where the trade-off parameter β is tuned
to comply with the bound C0. Since the action distribution
p(A|X) is the only distribution in the posterior model (20) that
changes during decision-making, i.e. during the transformation
from prior to posterior, the total free energy simplifies to
F (p) = 〈U〉p(X,S,A) − 1βDKL(p(X,S, A)‖p0(X,S, A))
= 〈V (X,A)〉p(A|X)p(X) − 1β
〈
DKL(p(A|X)‖p0(A))
〉
= 〈FA(p(A|X))〉p(X) ,
where we have written p0(x|s)p0(s) = p(s|x)p(x) using Bayes
rule (2), and
V (X,A) :=
∑
s,s′,x′
p(s|X) p0(s′|s,A) p0(x′|s′)U(x′) ,
FA(p(A|X)) := 〈V (X,A)〉p(A|X) − 1βDKL(p(A|X)‖p0(A)) .
Note that, here the expectation with respect to p(X) does not
affect the optimization with respect to p(A|X) since it can be
performed pointwise for each particular realization x of X . In
fact, we would have obtained the same result when conditioning
on an arbitrary value X= x from the outset. However, in gen-
eral, optimal information processing strategies may depend on
the entire distribution p(X) and can therefore not be obtained
from only considering single observations x, for example when
also optimizing with respect to the prior p0(A), see e.g. (Ge-
newein et al., 2015).
Free energy maximization. The optimal action distribution
p∗(A|X) maximizing FA is a Boltzmann distribution (8) with
“energy” V (X,A) and prior p0(A),
p∗(A|X) = 1Z(X) p0(A) e
βV (X,A) , (21)
whereZ(X) := ∑a p0(a)eβV (X,a). Note that in order to eval-
uate the utility V , it is required to determine the Bayes’ posterior
p(S|X). This shows how in a utility-based approach, the need to
performBayesian inference results directly from the assumption
about which variables are observed and which are not.
4.3. Critical points
The main idea of free energy in the context of information
processing with limited resources is that any computation can
be thought of abstractly as a transformation from a distribution
p0 of prior knowledge to a posterior distribution p that encap-
sulates an advanced state of knowledge resulting from delibera-
tion. The progress that is made through such a transformation
is quantitatively captured by two measures: the expected utility
〈U〉p that quantifies the quality of p andC(p, p0) that measures
the cost of uncertainty reduction from p0 to p. Clearly, the crit-
ical point of this framework is the choice of the cost functionC .
In particular, we could ask whether there is some kind of univer-
sal cost function that is applicable to any perception-action pro-
cess or whether there are only problem-specific instantiations.
Of course, having a universal measure that allows applying the
same concepts to extremely diverse systems is both a boon and a
bane, because the practical insights it may provide for any con-
crete instance could be very limited. This is the root of a number
of critical issues:
(i) What is the cost C? An important restriction of all delibera-
tion costs of the form C(p, p0) is that they only depend on the
initial and final distributions and ignore the process of how to
get from p0 to p. When varying a single resource (e.g. processing
time) we can useC(p, p0) as a process-independent proxy for the
resource. However, if there are multiple resources involved (e.g.
processing time, memory, and power consumption), a single cost
cannot tell us how these resources are weighted optimally with-
out making further process-dependent assumptions. In general,
the theory makes no suggestions whatsoever about mechanical
processes that could implement resource-optimal strategies, it
only serves as a baseline for comparison. Finally, simply requir-
ing the measure to be monotonic in the uncertainty reduction,
does not uniquely determine the form of C , as there have been
multiple proposals of uncertainty measures in the literature (see
e.g. (Csiszár, 2008)), where relative entropy is just one possibility.
However, relative entropy is distinguished from all other uncer-
taintymeasures in its additivity property, that for example allows
to express optimal probabilistic updates from p0 to p in terms of
additions or subtractions of utilities, such as log-likelihoods for
evidence accumulation in Bayesian inference.
(ii) What is the utility? When systems are engineered, utilities
are usually assumed to be given such that desired behavior is
specified by utility maximization. However, when we observe
perception-action systems, it is often not so clear what the util-
ity should be, or in fact, whether there even exists a utility that
captures the observed behavior in terms of utility maximization.
This question of the identifiability of a utility function is stud-
ied extensively in the economic sciences, where the basic idea is
that systems reveal their preferences through their actual choices
and that these preferences have to satisfy certain consistency ax-
ioms in order to guarantee the existence of a utility function.
In practice, to guarantee unique identifiability these axioms are
usually rather strong, for example ignoring the effects of history
and context when choosing between different items, or ignor-
ing the possibility that there might be multiple objectives. When
not making these strong assumptions, utility becomes a rather
generic concept, like the concept of probability, and additional
assumptions like soft-maximization are necessary to translate
from utilities to choice probabilities.
(iii) The problem of infinite regress. One of the main concep-
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tual issues with the interpretation of C as a deliberation cost is
that the original utility optimization problem is simply replaced
by another optimization problem that may even be more diffi-
cult to solve. This novel optimization problem might again re-
quire resources to be solved and could therefore be described by a
higher-level deliberation cost, thus leading to an infinite regress.
In fact, any decision-making model that assumes that decision-
makers reason about processing resources are affected by this
problem (Russell andSubramanian, 1995;Gigerenzer andSelten,
2001). A possible way out is to consider the utility-information
trade-off simply an as if description, since perception-action
systems that are subject to a utility-information trade-off do
not necessarily have to reason or know about their deliberation
costs. It is straightforward, for example, to design processes that
probabilistically optimize a given utility with no explicit notion
of free energy, but for an outside observer the resulting choice
distribution looks like an optimal free energy trade-off (Ortega
and Braun, 2014).
In summary, the free energy trade-off between utility and in-
formation primarily serves as a normative model for optimal
probability assignments in information-processingnodes or net-
works. Like other Bayesian approaches, it can also serve as a
guide for constructing and interpreting systems, although it is
in general not a mechanistic model of behavior. In that respect
it shares the fate of its cousins in thermodynamics and coding
theory (Shannon, 1948) in that they provide theoretical bounds
on optimality but devise no mechanism for processes to achieve
these bounds.
5. Variational free energy in Active Inference
5.1. The basic idea
Variational free energy is the main ingredient used in the Free
Energy Principle for biological systems in the neuroscience lit-
erature (Friston, 2005, 2010; Friston et al., 2015, 2006), which
has been considered as “arguably the most ambitious theory of
the brain available today” (Gershman, 2019). Since variational
free energy in itself is just a mathematical construct to measure
the dissimilarity between distributions and functions—see Sec-
tion 3—, the biological content of the Free Energy Principlemust
come from somewhere else. The basic biological phenomenon
that the Free Energy Principle purports to explain is homeosta-
sis, the ability to actively maintain certain relevant variables (e.g.
blood sugar) within a preferred range. Usually, homeostasis is
applied as an explanatory principle in physiology whereby the
actual value of a variable is compared to a target value and cor-
rections to deviation errors are made through a feedback loop.
However, homeostasis has also been proposed as an explana-
tory principle for complex behavior in the cybernetic literature
(Wiener, 1948; Ashby, 1960; Powers, 1973; Cisek, 1999)—for ex-
ample, maintaining blood sugar may entail complex feedback
loops of learning to hunt, to trade and to buy food. Crucially,
being able to exploit the environment in order to attain favor-
able sensory states, requires implicit or explicit knowledge of the
environment that could either be pre-programmed (e.g. insect
locomotion) or learnt (e.g. playing the piano).
The Free Energy Principle was originally suggested as a the-
ory of cortical responses (Friston, 2005) by promoting the free
energy formulation of predictive coding that was introduced by
Dayan and Hinton with the Helmholtz machine (Dayan et al.,
1995). It found its most recent incarnation in what is known
as Active Inference that attempts to extend variational Bayesian
inference to the problem of action selection. Here, the target
value of homeostasis is expressed through a probability distribu-
tion pdes under which desired sensory states have a high prob-
ability. The required knowledge about the environment is ex-
pressed through a generative model p0 that relates observations,
hidden causes, and actions. As the generative model allows to
make predictions about future states and observations, it en-
ables to choose actions in such a way that the predicted conse-
quences conform to the desired distribution. In Active Inference,
this is achieved by merging the generative and the desired dis-
tributions, p0 and pdes, into a single reference function φref to
which trial distributions q over the unknown variables are fit-
ted by minimizing the variational free energy F (q‖φref). This
free energy minimization is analogous to variational Bayesian
inference, where the reference is always given by a joint distri-
bution evaluated at observed quantities (cf. Section 3.2.1). In the
resulting homeostatic process, the trial distributions q play the
role of internal variables that aremanipulated in order to achieve
desired sensory consequences that are not directly controllable.
Minimizing variational free energy by the alternating variation
of trial distributions over actions qActions and trial distributions
over hidden states qStates,
min
qActions
F (q‖φref)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Action
and min
qStates
F (q‖φref)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Perception
, (22)
is then equated with processes of action and perception.
In a nutshell, the central tenet of the Free Energy Principle
states that organisms maintain homeostasis through minimiza-
tion of variational free energy between a trial distribution q and
a reference function φref by acting and perceiving. Sometimes
the even stronger statement is made that minimizing variational
free energy ismandatory for homeostatic systems (Friston, 2013;
Corcoran and Hohwy, 2018).
5.2. A Simple Example
Ingredients. Applying the Active Inference recipe (cf. Fig 7) to
our running example from Fig 1 with current and future states
S, S′, current and future observationsX,X ′, and action A, we
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e.g. through alternating optimization:
(example for                                    , i.e. partial mean-field)q = q(S )q(S′|A)q(A)
Figure 7. Overview of the Active Inference recipe, applied to our example from Fig 1.
need a generative model p0, a desired distribution pdes, and trial
distributions q. The generative model p0(X,S, A) is specified
by the factors in the decomposition (1), the desired distribution
pdes(X ′) is a given fixed probability distribution over future
sensory states X ′, and the trial distributions q are probability
distributions over all unknown variables, S, S′, X ′, andA.
In most treatments of Active Inference in the literature, the
trial distributions q are simplified, either by a full mean-field ap-
proximation over states and actions (Friston et al., 2013, 2015),
by a partial mean-field approximation where the dependency on
actions is kept but the states are treated independently of each
other (Friston et al., 2016, 2017a), or more recently (Schwöbel
et al., 2018; Parr et al., 2019) by the so-called Bethe approxima-
tion (Yedidia et al., 2001; Heskes, 2003), where subsequent states
are allowed to interact. In the partial mean-field assumption of
(Friston et al., 2016), the trial distribution over X ′ is fixed and
given by p0(X ′|S′), while forA, S and S′ the trial distributions
are variable but restricted to be of the mean-field form for S and
S′,
q(S, A) = q(S) q(S′|A) q(A), (23)
i.e., the hidden states S and S′ are assumed to be independent
givenA. While mean-field approximations can be good enough
for simple perceptual inference, where a single hidden cause
might be responsible for a set of observations, they can be too
strong simplifications for sequential decision-making problems
where the next state S′ depends on the previous state S. In fact,
as can be seen for example in S.2, mean-field assumptions may
fail to show goal-directed behavior even for very simple tasks
such as the navigation in a grid world. A less restrictive assump-
tion would be a Bethe approximation, a special case of Kikuchi’s
cluster variation method (Kikuchi, 1951), which allows S and S′
as well as S′ andX ′ to be stochastically dependent—cf. Section
C in Appendix A.1, where we derive the update equations un-
der the Bethe assumption for the simple example of this section.
In general, the Bethe approximation achieves exact marginals
in tree-like models, such as the models that are considered in
the Active Inference literature, because it results in update equa-
tions that are equivalent to Pearl’s belief propagation algorithm
(Yedidia et al., 2001; Pearl, 1988).
Reference function. The reference φref is constructed by com-
bining the two distributions pdes and p0. To do so, there have
been several proposals in the Active Inference literature, which
fall into one of two categories: either a specific value functionQ
is defined (containing pdes), which is multiplied to the genera-
tive model using a soft-max function (Friston et al., 2015, 2016,
2017a),
φref(X ′,S, A) := p0(X= x,X ′,S|A) 1Z p0(A)eQ(A) , (24)
or the desired distribution ismultiplied directly to the generative
model (Schwöbel et al., 2018),
φref(X ′,S, A) := pdes(X ′) p0(X= x,X ′,S, A). (25)
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While the reference function in (25) is already completely
specified, we still need to knowhow to determine the value func-
tionQ in the case of (24). For the partial mean-field assumption
(23) it is defined in the literature (Friston et al., 2016, 2017a) as
Q(a) := 〈U(X ′, S′)〉q(X′,S′|A= a) +H
(
q(X ′|A= a)), (26)
where U(x′, s′) := log pdes(x′) + log p0(x′|s′) favors both
desirable and plausible future observations x′. While here de-
sirability and plausibility is built into the value function Q id-
iosyncratically, in utility-based approaches (cf. Section 4.2) only
desirability has to be put into the design of the utility function,
because there the likelihood p0(X ′|S′) of future observations is
automatically taken into account by the expected utility V that
is (soft-)maximized by (21). Moreover, sinceQ can be rewritten
as
Q(a) = −DKL
(
q(X ′|A)‖pdes(X ′)
)−〈H(p0(X ′|S′))〉q(S′|A) ,
the extra entropy term in (26) has the effect of actions leading
to consequences that more or lessmatch the desired distribution,
while also explicitly punishing actions that lead to a high vari-
ability of observations (by requiring a low average entropy of
p0(X ′|S′)), rather than trying to produce the singlemost desired
outcome—see the discussion at the end of Section 5.3. Note also
that the value functionQ depends (non-linearly) on the trial dis-
tribution q(S′|A), because q(X ′|A) = ∑s′ p0(X ′|s′)q(s′|A)
is itself a function of q(S′|A), which is problematic during free
energy minimization (see (ii) in Section 5.3).
Free energy minimization. Once the form of the trial distributions
q—e.g. by a partial mean-field assumption (23) or a Bethe ap-
proximation (see Derivation of exemplary update equations)—
and the reference φref are defined, the variational free energy
is simply determined by F (q‖φref). In the case of a mean-field
assumption, the resulting free energy minimization problem is
solved approximately by performing an alternating optimiza-
tion scheme, in which the variational free energy is minimized
separately with respect to each of the variable factors in a fac-
torization of q, for example by alternating between minq(S) F ,
minq(S′|A) F , and minq(A) F in the case of the partial mean-
field assumption (23), where in each step the factors that are not
optimized are kept fixed (cf. Fig 7). In Derivation of exemplary
update equations we derive the update equations for the cases
(24) and (25) undermean-field and Bethe approximations for the
one-step example discussed in this section. Mean-field solutions
for the general case of arbitrarily many timesteps together with
their exact solutions can be found in Notebook: Comparison of
different formulations of Active Inference, where we also high-
light the theoretical differences between various proposed for-
mulations of Active Inference. The effect of some of these dif-
ferences can be seen in the grid world simulations in Notebook:
Grid world simulations.
5.3. Critical points
The main idea behind Active Inference is to express the prob-
lem of action selection in a similar manner to the perceptual
problem of Bayesian inference over hidden causes. In Bayesian
inference, agents are equipped with likelihood models p0(X|Z)
that determine the desirability of different hypotheses Z un-
der known data X . In Active Inference, agents are equipped
with a given desired distribution pdes(X ′) over future outcomes
that ultimately determines the desirability of actions A. An im-
portant difference that arises is that perceptual inference has to
condition on past observationsX = x, whereas naive inference
over actionswould have to condition on desired future outcomes
X ′ = x′.
For a single desired future observation x′, Bayesian in-
ference could be applied in a straightforward way by sim-
ply conditioning the generative model p0 on X ′= x′. Simi-
larly, one could condition on a desired distribution pdes(X ′)
using Jeffrey’s conditioning rule (Jeffrey, 1965), resulting in
p(A|pdes) =
∑
x′ p(A|x′) pdes(x′), which could be imple-
mented by first sampling a goal x′∼ pdes(X ′) and then infer-
ring p(A|x′) given the single desired observation x′. However,
one of the problemswith such a naive approach is that the choice
of a goal is solely determined by its desirability, whereas its real-
izability for the decision-maker is not taken into account. This is
because by conditioning on pdes, the decision-maker effectively
seeks to choose actions in order to reproduce ormatch the desired
distribution.
To overcome this problem, Control as Inference or Planning
as Inference approaches in the machine learning literature (Tou-
ssaint and Storkey, 2006; Todorov, 2008; Kappen et al., 2012;
Levine, 2018; O’Donoghue et al., 2020) do not directly condition
on desired future observations but on future success by introduc-
ing an auxiliary binary random variable R such that R = 1 en-
codes the occurence of desired outcomes. The auxiliary variable
R comeswith a probability distributionp0(R|X ′, ...) that deter-
mines how well the outcomes satisfy desirability criteria of the
decision-maker, usually defined in terms of the reward or utility
attached to certain outcomes—see the discussion in (iii) below.
The extra variable gives the necessary flexibility to infer success-
ful actions by simply conditioning on R= 1. The advantage of
such an approach over direct Jeffrey conditionalization given a
desired distribution over future observations can be seen in the
gridworld simulations inNotebook: Gridworld simulations, es-
pecially the ability of choosing a desired outcome that is not only
desirable but also achievable—see also Fig 8.
Active Inference tries to overcome the sameproblemof recon-
ciling realizability and desirability, but without explicitly intro-
ducing extra random variables and without explicitly condition-
ing on the future. Instead, the desired distribution is combined
with the generative model to form a new reference function φref
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such that the posteriors q∗ resulting from the minimization of
the free energy F (q‖φref) contain a baked-in tendency to reach
the desired future encoded by φref . This approach is the root of
a number of critical issues with current formulations of Active
Inference:
(i) How to incorporate the desired distribution into the reference?
Instead of using Bayesian conditioning directly in order to con-
dition the generative model p0 on the desired future, in Active
Inference it is required that the reference φref contains the de-
sired distribution in a way such that actions sampled from the
resulting posterior model are more likely if they lead to the de-
sired future. As can be seen already for the one-step case in (24)
and (25), the method of how to incorporate the desired distribu-
tion into the reference function is not unique and does not follow
from first principles. There have been essentially two different
proposals in the literature onActive Inference of how to combine
the two distributions pdes and p0 into φref (cf. Fig 7): Either a
hand-crafted value functionQ is designed that specifically mod-
ifies the action probability of the generativemodel, or the proba-
bility over futuresX ′ under the generative model p0 is modified
by directlymultiplying pdes to the likelihood p0(X ′|S′). We dis-
cuss both of these proposals in (ii) and (iii) below.
(ii) Proposal 1: Q-value Active Inference (Friston et al., 2013,
2015, 2016, 2017a)
In the most popular formulation of Active Inference, the
probability over actions in the reference φref is defined by
1
Z p0(A)eQ(A), where the value functionQ (also called the “ex-
pected free energy”) depends non-linearly on the trial distri-
butions q, as can be seen exemplarily in (26) for the one-step
case under the partial mean-field assumption of (Friston et al.,
2016, 2017a), where q(S′|A) enters Q through q(X ′|A) =∑
s′ p0(X ′|s′)q(s′|A). This means that both the trial distri-
butions q and the reference φref = φref(q) change when q is
varied during the minimization of the variational free energy
F (q‖φref(q)). Note that, in the Active Inference literature, this
extra q dependency ofQ is neglected when deriving the update
equations, because otherwise there are no closed-form solutions
possible—see our derivation of the update equations in Deriva-
tion of exemplary update equations and Notebook: Comparison
of different formulations of Active Inference. Instead, it is stated
that including this dependency has little numerical effect in the
models considered in the literature (Friston et al., 2015, Ap-
pendix B). However, as demonstrated by Notebook: Grid world
simulations, respecting this dependency can result in very dif-
ferent behavior, even in simple grid world simulations. This also
highlights a conceptual difference to variational Bayesian infer-
ence, where one assumes a fixed reference φ—resulting from the
evaluation of a fixed probabilistic model p0 at known variables
(see Section 3.2.1)—to which distributions q are fitted by min-
imizing F (q‖φ). When performing this optimization stepwise
by alternatingly optimizing with respect to different factors in
q (e.g. in the Bayesian EM algorithm), then the total free energy
is expected to change between each optimization step, but the
reference φ does not. Instead, in Q-value Active Inference, the
reference φref(q) also changes during the optimization process,
so that it is no longer clear what is actually achieved by this min-
imization.
Another issue with Q-value Active Inference models is the
mean-field approximation of the trial distributions q, under
which hidden states are assumed to be stochastically indepen-
dent. This simplification is too strong for sequential decision-
making tasks in environments where the current state depends
stochastically on previous states (seeNotebook: Gridworld sim-
ulations for a demonstration). While one could still define a value
function for less restrictive assumptions on the form of q, such as
the Bethe approximation, this would require to either craft a new
expression for the value functionQ, or to keep using less infor-
mative marginals to determineQ, such as q(S′|A), even though
more informative beliefs would be known, such as q(S′|S,A).
(iii) Proposal 2: direct Active Inference (Schwöbel et al., 2018)
When multiplying pdes to the generative model directly, as in
(25), then the resulting referenceφref is no longer given by a joint
distribution of observations, states, and actions (since in general∑
x′ pdes(x′)p0(x′|S′) 6= 1). Instead, this formulation of Ac-
tive Inference turns out to be a special case of previous Control
as Inference approaches in the machine learning literature (Tou-
ssaint and Storkey, 2006; Levine, 2018), where one conditions
on an auxiliary success variableR. In particular, for our running
example from Fig 1 with a probabilistic model of the form (1),
Control as Inference defines
p0(R = 1|X ′, S′, A) := er(X′,S′,A) = 1−p0(R= 0|X ′, S′, A) ,
where r = r(X ′, S′, A) denotes a general (negative) reward
function determining desirability. The full joint of the new set
of variables is then given by
p0(R,X,S, A) = p0(R|X ′, S′, A) p0(X,S, A). (27)
Control as Inference then conditions actions on both, the his-
tory and future success (R = 1). For our one-step example, this
results in the Bayes’ posterior
p(A|X= x,R= 1) = 1Z
∑
x′,s,s′
p0(R = 1|x′, s′, A)p0(x, s, A) .
(28)
It is straightforward to identify pdes(X ′) of Active Inference
as a particular choice of a success probability p0(R= 1|X ′), or
equivalently, log pdes(X ′) as a reward function r = r(X ′), so
that the joint distribution (27) reduces to the reference function
φref in (25). Thus, the version of Active Inference in (Schwöbel
et al., 2018) is simply a variational formulation of Control as In-
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ference that approximates exact posteriors of the form (28), like
other previous variational Bayes’ approaches (Toussaint, 2009;
Ziebart, 2010; Levine, 2018).
In summary, the assumption of a desired distribution pdes
over future outcomes has led to various attempts in the Active
Inference literature of using probabilistic inference to determine
profitable actions. Either an action distribution 1Z p0(A)eQ(A)
is built into the reference function, which presupposes optimal
behavior by designing a value function Q that leads to desired
consequences, or the outcome probability under the generative
model p0 is modified directly by multiplying pdes to p0. The lat-
ter case is the variational version of Control as Inference, well-
known in themachine learning literature (Toussaint andStorkey,
2006; Todorov, 2008; Toussaint, 2009; Ziebart, 2010; Kappen
et al., 2012; Levine, 2018; O’Donoghue et al., 2020). Considering
the issues of Q-value Active Inference discussed above, and the
fact that Control as Inference does not rely on a desired distri-
bution over outcomes, we could ask whether formulating pref-
erences by assuming a desired distribution is well-advised. As
can be seen from Fig 8, the difference between purely inference-
based methods, expected utility approaches, and Active Infer-
ence is mainly in how they treat the desired distribution. Should
pdes be matched or is it good enough if actions are chosen that
lead to a high desired outcome probability? While Control as
Inference and utility-based models essentially take the latter ap-
proach, Q-value Active Inference answers this question by re-
quiring that the desired distribution should be matched as long
as the average entropy of p0(X ′|S′) is small.
6. SoWhat Does Free Energy Bring To the Table?
6.1. A Practical Tool
It is unquestionable that the concept of free energy has seen
many fruitful practical applications outside of physics in the sta-
tistical and machine learning literature. As has been discussed in
Section 3, these applications generally fall into one of two cate-
gories, the principle of maximum entropy, and a variational for-
mulation of Bayesian inference. Here, the principle of maximum
entropy is interpreted in a wider sense of optimizing a trade-off
between uncertainty (entropy) and the expected value of some
quantity of interest (energy), which in practice often appears in
the form of regularized optimization problems (e.g. to prevent
overfitting) or as a general inference method allowing to deter-
mine unbiased priors and posteriors (cf. Section 3.1). In the vari-
ational formulation of Bayes’ rule, free energy plays the role of an
error measure that allows to do approximate inference by con-
straining the space of distributions over which free energy is op-
timized, but can also inform the design of efficient iterative in-
ference algorithms that result from an alternating optimization
scheme where in each step the full variational free energy is op-
timized only partially, such as the Bayesian EM algorithm, belief
propagation, and other message passing algorithms (cf. Section
3.2).
6.2. Theories of Intelligent Agency
These practical use-cases of free energy formulations have
also influenced models of intelligent behavior. In the cognitive
and behavioral sciences, intelligent agency has been modelled in
a number of different frameworks, including logic-based sym-
bolic models, connectionist models, statistical decision-making
models, and dynamical systems approaches. Even though statis-
tical thinking in a broader sense can in principle be applied to any
of the other frameworks as well, statistical models of cognition
in a more narrow sense have often focused on Bayesian mod-
els, where agents are equipped with probabilistic models of their
environment allowing them to infer unknown variables in or-
der to select actions that lead to desirable consequences (Tenen-
baum and Griffiths, 2001; Wolpert, 2006; Todorov, 2009). Natu-
rally, the inference of unknown variables in such models can be
achieved by a plethora ofmethods including the two types of free
energy approaches of maximum entropy and variational Bayes.
However, both free energy formulations go one step further in
that they attempt to extend both principles from the case of in-
ference to the case of action selection: utility optimization with
information constraints based on free energy from constraints
and Active Inference based on variational free energy.
While sharing similar mathematical concepts, both ap-
proaches differ in syntax and semantics. An apparent apple of
discord is the concept of utility (Gershman andDaw, 2012). Util-
ity optimizationwith information constraints requires the deter-
mination of a utility function, whereas Active Inference requires
the determination of a reference function. In the economic liter-
ature, subjective utility functions that quantify the preferences of
decision-makers are typically restrictive to ensure identifiability
when certain consistency axioms satisfied. In contrast, in Active
Inference the reference function involves determining a desired
distribution given by the preferred frequency of outcomes. How-
ever, these differences start to vanish whenweakening the utility
concept to something like log-probabilities, such that the utility
framework becomes more similar to the concept of probability
that is able to explain arbitrary behavior. Moreover, Active In-
ference has to solve the additional problem of marrying up the
agent’s probabilistic model with its desired distribution into a
single reference function (cf. Section 5.3). The solution to this
problem is not unique, in particular it lies outside the scope of
variational Bayesian inference, but it is critical for the resulting
behavior because it determines the exact solutions that are ap-
proximated by free energy minimization. In fact, as can be seen
in simple simulations such as S.2, the various proposals for this
merging that can be found in the Active Inference literature be-
have very differently.
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pdes(X′ )
p(A) =
1
Z
X
i
p(xi|A) pdes(xi)
Figure 8. Consequences of assuming a desired distribution pdes for action planning under purely inference-based methods, expected utility, and Active
Inference, in the case of a simple example with two actions, one with a deterministic outcome and one with random outcomes. As can be seen from the
displayed equations, conditioning on pdes (Jerey conditionalization) and conditioning on success (Control as Inference/direct Active Inference) only dier
in the order of normalizing and taking the expectation overX′. While conditioning on pdes requires to first sample a target outcome from pdes before an
action from p(A|x′) can be planned, conditioning on success directly weighs the desirability of an outcome pdes(x′) by its realizability p(x′|A). From this
point of view, the expected utility approach is very similar to Control as Inference (which can also be seen in the grid world environment Notebook: Grid
world simulations), since it also weighs the utility of an outcome with its realizability before so-maximizing. It only diers in how it treats the desired
distribution as an exponentiated utility, moving the utility values closer together so that option A = 1 is slightly preferred. The early version (Friston
et al., 2013) of Active Inference is similar to Jerey conditioning, because decision-makers are also assumed tomatch the desired distribution, by defining
the value functionQ as a KL divergence between the predicted and desired distributions. In later versions ofQ-value Active Inference (Friston et al., 2015,
2016, 2017a), the value function Q is modified by an additional entropy term that explicitly punishes observations with high variability. Consequently,
even when the eect of the action on future observations is kept the same, i.e. the predictive distribution p(X′|A) =
∑
s′ p0(X
′|s′)p0(s′|A) remains as
depicted in the le-hand column, the preference over actions now changes completely depending on p0(X′|S′)—whereas in the other approaches, only
the predictive distribution p(X′|A) and pdes(X′) influence planning. While there might be circumstances where this extra punishment of high outcome
variability could be beneficial, it is questionable from a normative point of view why anything else other than the predicted outcome probability p(X′|A)
should be considered for planning. See Details on the example in Fig 8 for details about the choices made in the example.
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Also, both approaches differ fundamentally in their motiva-
tion. The motivation of utility optimization with information
constraints is to capture the trade-off between precision and un-
certainty that underlies information processing. This trade-off
takes the form of a free energy once an informational cost func-
tion has been chosen (cf. Section 4.3). Note that Bayes’ rule can
be seen as the minimum of a free energy from constraints with
log-likelihoods as utilities, even though this equivalence is not
the primary motivation of this trade-off. In contrast, Active In-
ference ismotivated from casting the problemof action selection
itself as an inference process (Friston et al., 2013), as this allows
to express both action and perception as the result ofminimizing
the same function, the variational free energy. However, there is
no mystery in having such a single optimization function, be-
cause the underlying probabilistic model already contains both
action and perception variables in a single functional format and
the variational free energy is just a function of thatmodel. More-
over, while approximate inference can be formulated on the ba-
sis of variational free energy, inference in general does not rely
on this concept, in particular inference over actions can easily be
done without free energy (Dayan and Hinton, 1997; Toussaint
and Storkey, 2006; Todorov, 2008; Kappen et al., 2012; Levine,
2018).
However, there are also plenty of similarities between the two
free energy approaches. For example, the assumption of a soft-
max action distribution in Active Inference is similar to the pos-
terior solutions resulting from utility optimization with infor-
mation constraints. Moreover, the assumption of a desired fu-
ture distribution relates to constrained computational resources,
because the uncertainty constraint in a desired distribution over
future states may not only be a consequence of environmental
uncertainty, but could also originate from stochastic preferences
of a satisficing decision-maker that accepts a wide range of out-
comes. In fact, as we have seen in the discussion around Fig 8,
various methods for inference over actions differ in how they
treat preferences given by a distribution over desired outcomes:
some of them try to match the predictive and desired distribu-
tions, while others simply seek to reach states whose outcomes
have a high desired probability. In S.2, we provide a compari-
son of the discussed methods using grid world simulations, in
order to see their resulting behavior also in a sequential decision-
making task.
A remarkable resemblance among both approaches is the ex-
clusive appearance of relative entropy to measure dissimilar-
ity. In the Active Inference literature it is often claimed that
every homeostatic system must minimize variational free en-
ergy (Friston, 2013), which is simply an extension of relative en-
tropy for non-normalized reference functions (cf. Section 3.2.2).
In utility-based approaches, the relative entropy (19) is typically
used to measure the amount of information processing, even
though theoretically other cost functions would be conceivable
(Gottwald and Braun, 2019a). For a given homeostatic process,
the Kullback-Leibler divergence measures the dissimilarity be-
tween the current distribution and the limiting distribution and
therefore is reduced while approximating the equilibrium. Sim-
ilarly, in utility-based decision-making models, relative entropy
measures the dissimilarity between the current posterior and the
prior. In the Active Inference literature the stepwise minimiza-
tion of variational free energy that goes alongwithKLminimiza-
tion is often equated with the minimization of sensory surprise
(see Surprise minimization for a more detailed explanation), an
idea that stems from maximum likelihood algorithms, but that
has been challenged as a general principle (see (Biehl et al., 2020)
and the response (Friston et al., 2020)). Similarly, one could in
principle rewrite free energy from constraints in terms of infor-
mational surprise, which would however simply be a reword-
ing of the probabilistic concepts in log-space. The same kind
of rewording is well-known between probabilistic inference and
theminimumdescription length principle (Grünwald, 2007) that
also operates in log-space, and thus reformulates the inference
problem as a surpriseminimization problemwithout adding any
new features or properties.
6.3. Biological Relevance
So far we have seen how free energy is used as a technical
instrument to solve inference problems and its corresponding
appearance in different models of intelligent agency. Crucially,
these kinds of models can be applied to any input-output sys-
tem, be it a human that reacts to sensory stimuli, a cell that tries
to maintain homeostasis, or a particle trapped by a physical po-
tential. Given the existing literature that has widely applied the
concept of free energy to biological systems, wemay askwhether
there are any specific biological implications of these models.
Considering free energy from constraints, the trade-off be-
tween utility and information processing costs provides a nor-
mative model of decision-making under resource constraints,
that extends previous optimality models based on expected util-
ity maximization and Bayesian inference. Analogous to rate-
distortion curves in information theory, optimal solutions to
decision-making problems are obtained that separate achievable
from non-achievable regions in the information-utility plane
(cf. Fig 5). The behavior of real decision-making systems under
varying information constraints can be analyzed experimentally
by comparing their performancewith respect to the correspond-
ing optimality curve. One can experimentally relate abstract in-
formation processing costs measured in bits to task-dependent
resource costs like reactionor planning times (Schach et al., 2018;
Ortega and Stocker, 2016). Moreover, the free energy trade-off
can also be used to describe networks of agents, where each agent
is limited in its ability, but the system as a whole has a higher in-
formation processing capacity—for example, neurons in a brain
or humans in a group. In such systems different levels of ab-
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straction arise depending on the different positions of decision-
makers in the network (Lindig-León et al., 2019; Genewein et al.,
2015; Gottwald and Braun, 2019b). As we have discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3, just like coding and rate-distortion theory, utility theory
with information costs can only provide optimality bounds but
does not specify any particularmechanism of how to achieve op-
timality. However, by including more and more constraints one
canmake amodelmore andmoremechanistic and thereby grad-
ually move from a normative to a more descriptive model, such
as models that consider the communication channel capacity of
neurons with a finite energy budget (Bhui and Gershman, 2018).
Considering variational free energy, there is a vast literature
on biological applications mostly focusing on neural processing
(e.g. predictive coding, dopamine) (Schwartenbeck et al., 2015;
Friston et al., 2017b; Parr et al., 2019), but there are also a number
of applications aiming to explain behavior (e.g. human decision-
making, hallucinations) (Parr et al., 2018). Similarly to utility-
based models, Active Inference models can be studied in terms
of as if models, so that actual behavior can be compared to pre-
dicted behavior as long as suitable prior and likelihood models
canbe identified from the experiment. When applied to brain dy-
namics, the as if models are sometimes also given a mechanistic
interpretation by relating iterative update equations that appear
when minimizing variational free energy with dynamics in neu-
ronal circuits. As discussed in Section 3.2.3, the update equations
resulting for example frommean-field or Bethe approximations,
can often be written in message passing form in the sense that
the update for a given variable only has contributions that re-
quires the current approximate posterior of neighbouring nodes
in the probabilistic model. These contributions are interpreted
as local messages passed between the nodes andmight be related
to brain signals (Parr et al., 2019). Other interpretations (Friston
et al., 2006, 2017a; Bogacz, 2017) obtain similar update equations
by minimizing variational free energy directly through gradient
descent, which can again be related to neural coding schemes
like predictive coding. As these coding schemes have existed ir-
respective of free energy (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Aitchison and
Lengyel, 2017), especially since minimization of prediction er-
rors is already seen in maximum likelihood estimation (Rao and
Ballard, 1999), the question remains whether there are any spe-
cific predictions of the Active Inference framework that cannot
be explained with previous models (see (Colombo and Wright,
2018; Hohwy, 2020) for recent discussions of this question).
6.4. Conclusion
Any theory about intelligent behavior has to answer three
questions: where am I?, where do I want to go?, and how do I get
there?, corresponding to the three problems of inference and per-
ception, goals and preferences, and planning and execution. All
three problems can be addressed either in the language of prob-
abilities or utilities. Perceptual inference can either be consid-
ered as finding parameters that maximize probabilities or like-
lihood utilities. Goals and preferences can either be expressed
by utilities over outcomes or by desired distributions. The third
question can be answered by the two free energy approaches
that either determine future utilities based onmodel predictions,
or infer actions that lead to outcomes predicted to have high
desired probability or match the desired distribution. In stan-
dard decision-making models actions are usually determined by
a utility function that ranks different options, whereas percep-
tual inference is determined by a likelihood model that quanti-
fies how probable certain observations are. In contrast, both free
energy approaches have in common that they treat all types of
information processing, from action planning to perception, as
the same formal process of minimizing some form of free en-
ergy. But the crucial difference is not whether they use utilities
or probabilities, but how predictions and goals are interwoven
into action.
This article started out by tracing back the seemingly myste-
rious connection between Helmholtz free energy from thermo-
dynamics andHelmholtz’ view ofmodel-based information pro-
cessing that led to the analysis-by-synthesis approach of percep-
tion, as exemplified in predictive coding schemes, and in partic-
ular to discuss the role of free energy in current models of in-
telligent behavior. The mystery starts to dissolve when we con-
sider the two kinds of free energies discussed in this article, one
based on themaximum entropy principle and the other based on
variational free energy—a dissimilarity measure between distri-
butions and (generally unnormalized) functions that extends the
well-known Kullback-Leibler divergence from information the-
ory. The Helmholtz free energy is a particular example of an en-
ergy information trade-off that results from the maximum en-
tropy principle (Jaynes, 1957). Analysis-by-synthesis is a partic-
ular application of inference to perception, where determining
model parameters and hidden states can either be seen as a re-
sult of maximum entropy under observational constraints or of
fitting parameter distributions to the model through variational
free energy minimization. Thus, both notions of free energy can
be formally related as entropy-regularized maximization of log-
probabilities.
Conceptually, however, utility-based models with informa-
tion constraints serve primarily as ultimate explanations of be-
havior, this means they do not focus on mechanism, but on
the goals of behavior and their realizability under ideal circum-
stances. They have the appeal of being relatively straightfor-
ward generalization of standard utility theory, but they rely on
abstract concepts like utility and relative entropy that may not
be so straightforwardly related to experimental settings. While
these normative models have no immediate mechanistic inter-
pretation, their relevance for mechanistic models may be anal-
ogous to the relevance of optimality bounds in Shannon’s in-
formation theory for practical codes (Shannon, 1948). In con-
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trast, Active Inference models of behavior often mix ultimate
and proximate arguments of explaining behavior (Alcock, 1993;
Tinbergen, 1963), because they combine the normative aspect
of optimizing variational free energy with the mechanistic in-
terpretation of the particular form of approximate solutions to
this optimization. While mean-field approaches of Active Infer-
encemay be particularly amenable to suchmechanistic interpre-
tations, they are often too simple to capture complex behavior. In
contrast, the solutions of direct Active Inference resulting from
a Bethe assumption are equivalent to previous Control as Infer-
ence approaches (Toussaint and Storkey, 2006; Todorov, 2008;
Toussaint, 2009; Ziebart, 2010; Kappen et al., 2012; Levine, 2018;
O’Donoghue et al., 2020) that allow for Bayesianmessage passing
formulations whose biological implementability can be debated
irrespective of the existence of a free energy functional.
Finally, both kinds of free energy formulations of intelligent
agency are so general and flexible in their ingredients that it
might be more appropriate to consider them languages or tools
to phrase and describe behavior rather than theories that explain
behavior, in a sense similar to how statistics and probability the-
ory are not biological or physical theories but simply provide a
language in which we can phrase our biological and physical as-
sumptions.
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A. Appendices
A.1. Derivation of exemplary update equations
A.1.1. Q-value Active Inference
In the simple example of Section 5.2 under the partial mean-
field assumption (23), and in the case when the desired dis-
tribution pdes is combined with the generative model p0 via
the value function Q as shown in Equation (24), i.e. if φref ∝
p0(x,X ′,S, A) eQ(A), then the full free energy F (q‖φref) can
be written as
F (q‖φref) = F (q(S|A)q(A)‖p0(x|S)p0(S|A)p0(A)eQ(A))
=
〈
FS(A)−Q(A)
〉
q(A) +DKL(q(A)‖p0(A)) (29)
where, FS(A)−Q(A) is given by〈
log q(S) q(S
′|A) ∑s′ p0(X ′|s′)q(s′|A)
p0(x|S)p0(S) p0(S′|S,A) pdes(X ′)p0(X ′|S′)
〉
(30)
where the expectation is with respect to q(X ′,S|A). Thus, op-
timizing (29) over q(A), while keeping q(S|A) fixed, results in a
Boltzmann distribution with prior p0(A) and energy FS(A) −
Q(A). When optimizing F (q‖φref) with respect to q(S) while
keeping q(S′|A) and q(A) fixed, we have
q∗(S) = argmax
q(S)
F (q‖φref) = argmax
q(S)
〈FS(A)〉q(A)
= argmax
q(S)
〈
log q(S)
p0(x|S)p0(S)e〈T 〉q(S′|A)q(A)
〉
q(S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F
(
q(S)
∥∥p0(x|S)p0(S)e〈T〉)
, (31)
where T := log p0(S′|S,A) is shorthand for the log-transition
probability. Hence, from (31) we can read off the solution q∗(S)
in virtue of the general optimum (14) of variational free energy.
While here it was enough to optimize 〈FS〉q , because in contains
the only dependencies of F (q‖φref) on q(S), this is not the case
for q(S′|A), since alsoQ depends on q(S′|A). Thus, when op-
timizing (29) over q(S′|A) while keeping q(A) and q(S) fixed,
one has to optimize 〈FS − Q〉 which does not take the form of
a free energy in q(S′|A) due to the functional dependency of
q(X ′|A) = ∑s′ p0(X ′|s′)q(s′|A) on q(S′|A) that appears in
(30). However, this type of dependency is largely ignored in the
Active Inference literature (as for example noted in the appendix
of (Friston et al., 2015)), since the optimization with respect to
q(S′|A) would not have a closed-form solution otherwise.
Once this term is ignored, then the objective for q(S′|A) takes
a very simple form,
q∗(S′|A) = argmax
q(S′|A)
F (q‖φref)
≈ argmax
q(S′|A)
〈
log q(S
′|A)
e〈T 〉q(S)
〉
q(S′|A)
, (32)
from which we can again read off the resulting update equation.
In total, from (29),(31), and (32) we obtain the set of equations
q∗(S) = 1Z p0(x|S)p0(S)e〈T 〉q(S′|A)q(A) (33a)
q∗(S′|A) ≈ 1Z(A) e〈T 〉q(S) (33b)
q∗(A) = 1Z p0(A)e
−FS(A)+Q(A), (33c)
where Z denotes the respective normalization constants and
T = log p0(S′|S,A).
It is important to note, however, that update equations in Ac-
tive Inference resulting from a mean-field assumption (even if it
is a partial mean-field assumption such as (23)) should be taken
with care, since—as is demonstrated in the grid world simula-
tions in S2 Notebook—even in very simple situations the result-
ing agents fail to correctly plan actions that lead to desired states.
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A.1.2. Direct Active Inference (variational Control as Inference)—
mean-field assumption
Here, we derive the update equations resulting from themini-
mization of the variational free energy for the reference defined
in Equation (25a), i.e. a variational formulation of Control as in-
ference (Toussaint and Storkey, 2006), under the mean-field as-
sumption (23). We start by writing the variational free energy
F (q‖φref) in a form analogous to (29), where now φref is given
by p0(X ′|S′)p0(x,S|A)p0(A),
F (q‖φref) =
〈
F (q(S|A)‖p0(x,S|A))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=FS(A)
−G(A)
〉
q(A)
+DKL(q(A)‖p0(A)) ,
where
G(A) :=
〈
〈log pdes(X ′)〉p0(X′|S′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:g(S′)
〉
q(S′|A)
.
Note that, compared toQ-value Active Inference, herewe do not
have tomake any additional approximations, becauseG only de-
pends linearly on q(S′|A).
Similarly to above, when optimizing with respect to q(A)
while keeping q(S) and q(S′|A) fixed, we obtain that q∗(A) is
a Boltzmann distribution with energy FS −G and prior p0(A).
Optimizing q(S) while keeping q(A) and q(S′|A) constant has
the same result as shown in (33a) because as before the only de-
pendencies on q(S) are inFS. Finally, in order to read off the so-
lution of the optimizationwith respect to q(S′|A)while keeping
q(S) and q(A) constant, we can rewrite FS −G as follows
q∗(S′|A) = argmax
q(S′|A)
F (q‖φref) = argmax
q(S′|A)
(
FS(A)−G(A)
)
= argmax
q(S′|A)
〈
log q(S
′|A)
e〈T 〉q(S)+g(S′)
〉
q(S′|A)
so that in total we obtain the set of equations
q∗(S) = 1Z p0(x|S)p0(S)e〈T 〉q(S′|A)q(A) (34a)
q∗(S′|A) = 1Z(A) e〈T 〉q(S)+g(S
′) (34b)
q∗(A) = 1Z p0(A)e
−FS(A)+G(A), (34c)
where Z denotes the respective normalization constants, and
again T = log p0(S′|S,A).
It is noteworthy that recently another free energy approach
similar to Active Inference has been introduced that does not
make use of variational free energy, but of a different functional
termed generalized free energy (Parr and Friston, 2019). Despite of
the different functional form, this version uses a reference func-
tion that is similar to the direct Active Inference approach, where
the desired distribution is also multiplied directy to the gener-
ative model but with a renormalization that results in a modi-
fied generative model over observations, states, and actions. Us-
ing this renormalized reference in a variational free energy ap-
proach would result in trivial inference reproducing the fixed
prior p0(A), corresponding to Bayes’ conditioning the modified
generative model on the past analogous to perceptual Bayesian
inference, e.g. p(A|X) = p0(A) in the case of the one-step ex-
ample. In contrast, the minimization of the free energy func-
tional used in (Parr and Friston, 2019) does not correspond to a
Bayesian inference process, which is why we do not further dis-
cuss it here.
A.1.3. Direct Active Inference (variational Control as Inference)—
Bethe assumption
Here, we derive the update equations resulting from the min-
imization of the variational free energy for the reference (25a)
under a Bethe approximation, which therefore is a more pre-
cise variational formulation of Control as Inference as themean-
field approximation of the previous section. In fact, it turns out
that such equations are equivalent to Belief propagation (Yedidia
et al., 2001), a well-known inference method that produces exact
marginals in tree-like graphs (Pearl, 1988), such as the probabilis-
tic models considered in the article and in the Active Inference
literature.
Analogous to the previous section, without any specific re-
strictions on qwe canwrite the total free energy for the one-step
example from Section 5.2 with the reference (25a) as
F (q‖φref) =
〈
log q(X
′, S, S′|A)
p0(R= 1, X= x,X ′, S, S′|A)
〉
q︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: 〈F (A)〉q(A)
+ DKL(q(A)‖p0(A))
fromwhich it immediately follows that minimizing with respect
to q(A), while considering q(X ′, S, S′|A) constant, results in
a Boltzmann distribution with energy F (A) and prior p0(A).
F (A) is the variational free energy of q(X ′, S, S′|A) with re-
spect to the reference p0(R= 1, X= x,X ′, S, S′|A) given by
p0(x|S)p0(S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:f1(S)
p0(S′|S,A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:f2(S,S′)
p0(X ′|S′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:f3(S′,X′)
pdes(X ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:f4(X′)
.
Thus, minimizingF (A)with respect to q(X ′, S, S′|A)without
any restrictions or simplifications results in the exact Bayes’ pos-
terior p(X ′, S, S′|A,R = 1, X = x)
1
Z(A) f1(S) f2(S, S
′) f3(S′, X ′) f4(X ′) ,
where Z(A) denotes the corresponding normalization< con-
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stant. The problem thatwewant to solve is to find an approxima-
tion to this Bayes’ posterior that is more precise than the mean-
field approximation of the previous section but requires less in-
volved computations than the determination of Z(A). While
one attempt is to partition the full graph into smaller graphs
and apply a naive mean-field approximation inside of each sub-
graph, known as a structuredmean-field approximation (Saul and
Jordan, 1996), the Bethe approximation follows a slightly dif-
ferent approach. It is the simplest version of the cluster varia-
tion methods often attributed to Kikuchi (Kikuchi, 1951), a fam-
ily of region-based free energy approximations (Yedidia et al.,
2005), where one keeps beliefs over different sections of the fac-
tor graph. Specifically, in the Bethe assumption, the regions con-
sist of each factor and its neighbouring nodes, which can also be
seen as allowing pair-wise interactions. Following the system-
atic treatment in (Yedidia et al., 2005), the Bethe approximation
for our example consists of seven belief functions, one for each
factor, b1, . . . , b4, and one for each variable, bS , bS′ , and bX′ ,
q(S, S′, X ′|A) = b1(S)b2(S, S
′)b3(S′, X ′)b4(X ′)
bS(S)bS′(S′)bX′(X ′)
(35)
where the marginals of the factor beliefs are required to be con-
sistent with the single-variable beliefs. Thus, the variational free
energy F (A) can be written as
F (A) =
4∑
k=1
〈
log bk
fk
〉
bk
−
∑
Y ∈{S,S′,X′}
〈log bY 〉bY
which has to be minimized under the consistency and normal-
ization contraints, leading to the Lagrangian
F (A) +
∑
s
λ1(s)
(
bS(s)− b1(s)
)
+
∑
s
λ2S(s)
(
bS(s)−
∑
s′
b2(s, s′)
)
+
∑
s′
λ2S′(s′)
(
bS′(s′)−
∑
s
b2(s, s′)
)
+
∑
s′
λ3S′(s′)
(
bS′(s′)−
∑
x′
b3(s′, x′)
)
+
∑
x′
λ3X′(x′)
(
bX′(x′)−
∑
s′
b3(s′, x′)
)
+
∑
x′
λ4(x′)
(
bX′(x′)− b4(x′)
)
+
4∑
k=1
γk
(∑
bk − 1
)
+
∑
Y ∈{S,S′,X′}
γY
(∑
bY − 1
)
where the Lagrange multipliers for the consistency constraints
are denoted by λ and the Lagrange multipliers for the normal-
ization constraints by γ. The equations for the beliefs at the sta-
tionary points (zeroes of the derivatives of the Lagrangian) are
b1(s) ∝ f1(s) eλ1(s) ,
b2(s, s′) ∝ f2(s, s′) eλ2S(s) eλ2S′ (s′) ,
b3(s′, x′) ∝ f3(s′, x′) eλ3S′ (s′) eλ3X′ (x′) ,
b4(x′) ∝ f4(x′) eλ4(x′) ,
bS(s) ∝ eλ1(s) eλ2S(s) ,
bS′(s′) ∝ eλ2S′ (s′) eλ3S′ (s′) ,
bX′(x′) ∝ eλ3X′ (x′) eλ4(x′) ,
where the proportionality sign ∝ means that the left-hand
side results from normalizing the right hand-side to obtain a
probability distribution. By writing ml := eλl for all l ∈
{1, 2S, 2S′, 3S′, 3X ′, 4}, we obtain from the stationarity con-
ditions and the consistency constraints
m2S(s) ∝ f1(s) (36a)
m1(s) ∝
∑
s′
f2(s, s′)m2S′(s′) (36b)
m3S′(s′) ∝
∑
s
f2(s, s′)m2S(s) (36c)
m2S′(s′) ∝
∑
x′
f3(s′, x′)m3X′(x′) (36d)
m4(x′) ∝
∑
s′
f3(s′, x′)m3S′(s′) (36e)
m3X′(x′) ∝ f4(x′) . (36f)
The update equations for the beliefs in (35) can be obtained by
iterating the equations in (36) and using the stationarity condi-
tions that express the beliefs in terms of the ml. Note that the
quantities denoted by ml are usually interpreted as local mes-
sages that are sent between the nodes and factors of the underly-
ing graphical model (Yedidia et al., 2005), e.g.m3S′ is considered
amessage sent fromnodeS′ to factor 3, which can be used to de-
termine the messagem4 from factor 3 to nodeX ′ by weighing
with f3 and summing over S′, etc. By this identification, vari-
ational inference under the Bethe approximation is equivalent
to belief propagation. While in (36) there is at most one message
that ismultiplied to the factor fk before the sum is taken, inmore
complex factor graphs, where more than 2 nodes are connected
to a factor, the messages coming in to a factor from the neigh-
boring nodes are multiplied before they are summed to calculate
the outgoingmessage, which is why this type ofmessage-passing
is also known as the sum-product algorithm.
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A.2. Details on the example in Fig 8
Here, we are giving additional details on Figure 8 in the
article. We consider the simple example of three possible
observations, x1, x2, x3, a desired distribution pdes(X ′) =
(1/3, 1/6, 1/2), two actions a with predictive distributions
p(X ′|A= 1) = (1, 0, 0) and p(X ′|A= 2) = (0, 1/2, 1/2), and
a constant prior p0(A) = (1/2, 1/2). We can consider
p(X ′|A) as a result of marginalizing the generative model
p0(X ′, S′, A) = p0(X ′|S′)p0(S′|A)p0(A)with state distribu-
tions p(S′|A= 1) = (1, 0, 0) and p(S′|A= 2) = (0, 1/2, 1/2)
and an emission probability p0(X ′|S′) that is chosen such that
the given p(X ′|A) equals p(X ′|A) = ∑s′ p0(X ′|s′)p0(s′|A).
Suitable emission probabilities have for example the form
p0(X ′= xi|S′= sj) = Mij(t), where
M(t) =
 1 0 00 t 1−t
0 1−t t

for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the resulting average entropies
〈H(p0(S′|A= 2))〉p0(S′|A=2) are in the range [0, 1] bit forA =
2 (always zero forA = 1), where the extreme values are assumed
at t ∈ {0, 1} (0 bit) and t = 1/2 (1 bit).
Furthermore, for the application of Active Inference in Fig-
ure 8, we have considered an exact version of the value func-
tion, Q=Qexact, where the trial distribution q(S′|A) is re-
placed by the exact predictive distribution p0(S′|A). In this
“exact” interpretation, the corresponding action distributions
p(A) ∝ p0(A)eQexact(A) could then be viewed as defining the
ideal behaviour that is approximated by the variational free en-
ergy minimization. In the Active Inference literature, p(A) ∝
p0(A)eQ(A) is considered a “prior”, because it is viewed as part of
the generative model and thus is part the input to the variational
inference process. However, by consideringQ an approximation
ofQexact these distributions can be viewed as defining the ideal
behavior that is approximated by the trial distributions during
free energyminimization and are thereforemore in line with the
“posteriors” in other decision-making models (even though the
value function Q(A)—and therefore p(A)—is presupposed, in
constrast to being the result of some principle).
A.3. Surprise minimization
The (informational) surprise or surprisal of a given element x
with respect to a probability distribution p0(X) is defined as
S0 := −log p0(x), i.e. it is simply a strictly decreasing function
of probability such that outcomes x with low probability have
high surprise and outcomes x with high probability have low
surprise. A common statement found in the literature (Parr and
Friston, 2017) is that variational free energy is an upper bound
on surprise and thusminimizing free energy alsominimizes sur-
prise. This idea originates from the special case of greedy infer-
ence with latent variables, where, for fixed data x, the goal is to
maximize the likelihood pθ(x) =
∑
z pθ(x, z) with respect to a
parameter θ. If the marginalization over the latent variable Z is
too hard to carry out directly, then one might take advantage of
the bound
F (q(Z)‖pθ(x, Z)) ≥ − log pθ(x) =: Sθ, (37)
i.e. that the variational free energy of q(Z) is an upper bound
on the surprise Sθ , which might therefore be reduced by mini-
mizing its upper bound with respect to θ as a proxy. In the varia-
tional Bayes’ approach to the above inference problem, where θ
is treated as a random variable Θ, minimization with respect to
θ is replaced by the minimization with respect to q(Θ). In this
case, the analogous bound to (37) is
F (q(Z|Θ)q(Θ)‖p0(x, Z,Θ)) ≥ − log
∑
z
e〈log p0(x,z,Θ)〉q(Θ) ,
where the right-hand side is the minimum of the left-hand side
with respect to q(Z|Θ). In this sense, variational free energy is
generally not a bound on the surprise SΘ anymore, but on a log-
sum-exp version of it instead. Nonetheless, also in this Bayesian
approach, variational free energy is an upper bound on the sur-
prise S0,
F (q(Z|θ)q(θ)‖p0(x, Z,Θ)) ≥ − log p0(x) = S0, (38)
where the right-hand side is the minimum of the left-hand side
with respect to both q(Z|θ) and q(θ). However, in contrast to
(37), there is no variable left in S0 over which one could mini-
mize. Therefore, saying that minimizing free energy also mini-
mizes surprise (Parr and Friston, 2017), is generally only true in
the sense thatminimizing free energyminimizes an upper bound
on surprise, however surprise itself is not minimized. Instead,
the important fact about (38) is that equality is achieved by the
Bayes’ posteriors q(Z|Θ) = p0(Z|Θ, x) and q(Θ) = p0(Θ|x)
as discussed in Section 3.2.1.
S. Supplementary Material
The following ancillary files are provided as supplementary
material:
S.1. Notebook: Comparisonofdierent formulationsof Active In-
ference
A detailed comparison of the different formulations of Active
Inference found in the literature (2013-2018), including their
mean-field and exact solutions in the general case of arbitrary
many time steps.
S.2. Notebook: Grid world simulations
We provide implementations of the models discussed in this
article in a grid world environment, both as a rendered html file
as well as a jupyter notebook that is available on github.
